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‘Protectionist but globalised?  
Latin American custom duties and trade during the pre-1914 belle époque’ 
 
Recent evidence seems to demonstrate that Latin America was the most protectionist region 
in the world from at least 1865 up to World War I.
1 This is a surprising fact, given that Latin 
America is believed to have exploited globalisation forces better than most regions before the 
1920s. Even when it is recognised that high tariffs mostly responded to the revenue needs of 
the Latin American governments, the implicit assumption is that ‘high tariffs still must have 
had a powerful protective effect’.
2 This adds to the perplexity for most of us ‘who have 
always been taught to view the Great Depression as the critical turning point when the region 
is said to have turned towards protection and de-linked from the world economy for the first 
time’.
3  
This paper comes to show that there is no contradiction between the high custom collection 
by the Latin American republics and their high level of interaction with the global economy 
in the pre-1914 belle époque, although large country differences can be observed when 
descending from the regional to the national level.  
The data provided by the United Kingdom Statistical Abstract for the Principal and Other 
Foreign Countries, allows investigating this matter in detail from 1890 to 1912. Since the 
Latin American republics made for a large share of the independent countries of the world in 
the pre-1914 years, data of trade is available for 23 Latin American countries with custom 
                                                 
1Coatsworth, J. H. and J.G. Williamson. 2004. "Always Protectionist? Latin American Tariffs from 
Independence to Great Depression." Journal of Latin American Studies, 36, pp. 205-32. 
2 Bértola, L. and J.G. WILLIAMSON. 2006. "Globalization in Latin America Before 1940," in The Cambrigde 
Economic History of Latin America. V Bulmer-Thomas, J. H. Coatsworth and Roberto Cortés Conde eds. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.13 
3 Coatsworth, J. H. and J.G. Williamson. 2002. "The roots of Latin American Protectionism: Looking before the 
Great Depression." NBER Working Papers, 8999.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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data provided for about half of them. The full set of data includes total value of imports and 
exports of merchandise into and from over 80 countries plus, data on total custom duties 
collected in 30 of those.  With these data is possible to construct the average tariff rate, 
measured as custom revenues as a share of total import values. 
The data collected for this paper corroborates the fact that the Latin American republics had 
no rival on maximising revenues from custom collection. In addition, the cross-country 
comparisons show that countries with higher average tariff rates tended to be the ones with 
the most favourable trade balances. Here again, Latin America had no rival, exhibiting export 
surpluses for almost every one of the republics for almost the whole period. Logic indicates 
that may be the expected result of effective protection on the import side. Yet, such 
explanation would imply these countries would show very little imports in contrast with 
nations with lower tariffs. It was not always the case. Despite their relatively bulky custom 
collections, a large group of leading Latin American countries were generous importers, only 
behind the larger commercial countries of Western Europe in terms of imports per capita. 
Since in parallel these countries had considerable trade surpluses, the immediate implication 
is that the levels of exports per capita of Latin America were also among the largest in the 
world. Thus this paper shows it is possible to reconcile high custom duties with a strong 
participation in the global economy. 
The paper is organised in the following manner. The first section of the paper provides the 
background to the export-led ‘belle époque’ by using the data set assembled here in order to 
corroborate some commonplaces, qualify few others, and more crucially place Latin 
American exports within the international context. The second section reassess the evidence 
regarding the collection of custom duties in Latin America, both in terms of average tariff 
rate and custom collections per capita and compare those with the ones found in the other 
independent countries of the time. It highlights the crucial importance of custom duties for 
the Latin American governments. The third section shows that large custom collection was 
matched with relatively large amounts of imports per capita in Latin America, but also that it 
was not so in other countries imposing high tariffs (Russian Empire, the United States, 
Portugal, Greece, Philippines, etc).  Some tentative explanations are outlined for these results 
to hold: the possibility of a differential price-elasticity of demand for imports in Latin 
America, the inadequacy of using average tariff rates as indicator of protection and finally                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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the problems associated with the data reported as customs collections. The conclusions 
summarise the main findings of the paper.  
What it is clear from the results of this paper is that Latin American citizens were much more 
linked to international trade than citizens of Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, the Russian 
Empire or the United States. In per capita terms, their relation to the world economy was 
tighter both via their imports and their exports. More crucially, Latin American governments 
depended on revenues generated by international trade as no other independent government 
of the time. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that when the international markets were 
shaken from 1914 onwards, no other citizens were more hurt than the Latin American ones.  
 
1. The linkage through exports in the ‘belle époque’ 
During the phase of the first era of globalisation, 1870-1913 Latin America was the single 
major world region that did not worsen its position relative to the United States, hence 
improving vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
4 By then, Latin America and the Caribbean had 
overcome some of the most important limitations in order to start off the process of economic 
modernisation .
5 The economic policy associated with such performance was primarily 
concerned with a strong export performance.
6 Governments knew, or thought they knew, 
what to do to promote the exports - modest export taxes, infrastructures and foreign 
investments.
7 As a result, Latin American countries commanded the world markets of several 
primary products by the eve of World War I:  Brazil contributed to more than 70 per cent of 
world coffee production; Mexico more than 30 per cent of the world's silver output; Bolivia 
to more than 20 per cent of world tin production; a small country such  Ecuador generated 
                                                 
4 Prados de la Escosura, L. 2006. "The economic consequences of independence in Latin America," in The 
Cambridge Economic History of Latin America. V Bulmer-Thomas, J. H. Coatsworth and Roberto Cortés 
Conde eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 463-504.:p. 501 
5 Skidmore, T.E. and P.H. Smith. 1996. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
6 Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 2003. The Economic History of Latin America since Independence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.: p.49 
7 Useful overviews of the export-led belle époque are: Thorp, Rosemary. 1989. "Economy, 1914-1929," in Latin 
America Economy and Society 1870-1930. L Bethell ed. Cambridge, pp. 57-82.; the relevant chapter in Thorp, 
Rosemary. 1998. Progress, Poverty and Exclusion. An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century. 
New York: Inter-American Development Bank.; Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 2003. The Economic History of Latin 
America since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and the brand new. Salvucci, R. 2006. 
"Export-led Industrialisation," in The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America. V Bulmer-Thomas, J. H. 
Coatsworth and Roberto Cortés Conde eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 249-92.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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more than 15 percent of cacao world exports, and Cuban sugar production represented 25 
percent of world sugar cane output and much higher proportion of sugar-cane exports.
8 
While there is no much new to say about the increasing level of exports of the Latin 
American economies prior to 1914, it is worth using the data set assembled here in order to 
corroborate some commonplaces, qualify few others, and more crucially place Latin America 
within the international context. The data provided by the United Kingdom Statistical 
Abstract for the Principal and Other Foreign Countries includes, among other information, 
total value of imports and exports of merchandise for 23 Latin American countries with 
different degree of detail from 1890 to 1912, expressed in the currency of each country and 
in English currency.
9 The later is used throughout the paper.
10 
Figure 1 plots the total exports of the region by country and provides some first insights into 
the period.
11 Firstly, the trend for the overall region is clearly upwards, as expected, but not 
dramatic. In the second place it is already visible the great diversity of the continent, too 
often spoken off as a single homogeneous entity. The larger exporters of the region, 
Argentina and Brazil, have been for long the main characters of the Latin American portraits 
of the belle-époque. Not in vain their growing exports to the world generally doubled the 
                                                 
8 Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 2003. The Economic History of Latin America since Independence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
9 The Abstract was first published in the 1875 covering data back to 1860. Subsequent annual editions provided 
increasing amount of data and detail. Prior to 1890 much of the detail of the Latin American countries was not 
recorded.  For most graphs and tables of this section, 19 republics are represented (namely Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru,  Puerto Rico, Uruguay and Venezuela) leaving out 4 Dutch and French colonial 
territories for which trade figures are also available (Curacao -Dutch West Indies-, Surinam -Dutch Guiana-, 
French Guiana, Martinique and Guadalupe) but for which populations are not available at this time. The British 
territories in the area are listed in a separate sister volume dealing with the British possessions and are excluded 
in this paper. Haiti and Dominican Republic are entirely missing from the Abstract data. 
10 Both the OxLAD.  "Oxford Latin American Economic History Database (OxLAD).". Latin American Centre 
at the Oxford University.and  Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 2003. The Economic History of Latin America since 
Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. provide data of  total exports and imports for Latin 
America. Their figures are mostly based on the data collection by, Mitchell, B.R. . 1993. International 
Historical Statistics - The Americas, 1750-1993. Basingstoke: McMillan. which was produced in the national 
currencies. Yet, as  Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 2003. The Economic History of Latin America since Independence. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. recognises, in order to make them comparable  ‘this requires 
knowledge of the relevant exchange rates which –for the 19
th century- was not always simple to acquire’ 
(p.412).  But in fact Mitchell says ‘certain gaps have been filled from the British Statistical Abstract for Foreign 
Countries (1872-1912)' (p. xv). So using the Abstract shall be equivalent to using Mitchell, with the plus of 
avoiding the hazards of the exchange rates making comparisons far easier. 
11 Special imports and exports (for home consumption) are normally listed and are the ones used in this paper. 
When only general imports and exports were reported, these were used. The value of imports and exports 
referred to merchandise only, excluding trade of gold and silver bullion for which a different table was provided 
in the Abstract.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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total amounts exported by the immediate followers, namely Chile, Mexico and Cuba. Of 
these three, the fastest growth corresponded to Mexico, which according to these series, 
started the period far behind Chile but achieved its very same levels by the eve of the 
Mexican Revolution. Uruguay appears as a fairly stable exporter, not growing much but 
keeping its position as the fifth larger exporter of the region. Venezuela is the only country of 
the large exporters that seems to lose ground. With the available data (only 1890-1894 then 
interpolated to the next data offered in 1904), Venezuela went from being among the large 
exporters in 1890 to be left behind by Peru, the impressive export growth of Puerto Rico, 
Bolivia and Colombia. All of which exhibited clear growth trends in their total exports prior 
to World War I. 
 
[FIGURE1: TOTAL EXPORTS IN LATIN AMERICA 1890-1912 ] 
 
Even the smaller countries participated increasingly in the world markets over the period. 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Salvador doubled their total exports over the first 
decade of the 20
th century. Finally, among those counting their exports in thousands of 
pounds rather than millions, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama and the Dutch and French 
possessions the growth trend flatten out, except for Panama and Curaçao (Dutch West 
Indies). 
The differences in the total amounts exported reflect the different endowments of the Latin 
American republics but overall, the different population sizes of the countries.
12 While Brazil 
and Mexico counted populations of over ten million people, the average Latin American 
republic started the period with populations between 1 and 4 million people. Furthermore, 
Central America and few others, including some large exporters such as Uruguay, counted 
their populations in hundred of thousands not millions. Therefore, the evolution of the 
exports per capita is more telling than the total figures. These are shown in Figure 2. 
 
[FIGURE 2: EXPORTS PER CAPITA IN LATIN AMERICA 1890-1912] 
                                                 
12 Latin American populations borrowed from the database behind. Yañez, C., M.d.M. Rubio, and A. Carreras. 
2006. "Economic modernisation in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1890 and 1925: A view from the 
energy consumption," in 2006 Cliometrics Conference. Binghamton, NY.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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The evolution of the Latin American exports per capita alters considerably the ranking of 
countries and insists in the discrepant trends across the region. To start with, with these series 
the Uruguayans were the Latin American citizens getting the most per capita out of the 
international markets by the end of the 19
th century.
13 Nevertheless, the stagnation mentioned 
above also shows up in the per capita exports of Uruguay throughout the period. This 
allowed the immediate followers, Argentineans first and Cubans later on, to catch up and 
surpass the Uruguayan levels. In fact, these three were the only ones able to extract over 5 
pounds sterling per capita from exports in the 19
th century, but while the former two doubled 
their exports per capita, Uruguay kept the level.  Once started the 20
th century, Chile joined 
this privileged group, and so did Puerto Rico coming from much lower initial levels led by 
the U.S. investments in sugar after 1898. Costa Rica was the last one of the group of 
countries ahead of the rest of the region in exports per capita. A common feature of the 
advanced group is the fact that export growth appear to have been much more important for 
the first decade of the 20
th century than over the last decade of the 19
th century. 
At a much lower level was the rest of the region, exporting less than half the amounts per 
capita of the last of the advanced group. Venezuela and Paraguay, for which only partial data 
are available, seem to have lost ground over the period, only to recover it from 1905. Brazil 
doubled its exports per capita over the first decade of the 20
th century, but still by 1912 it 
barely achieved a level of exports per capita equivalent to those of Chile back in 1890. 
Equally, Bolivia almost doubled its exports per capita, thanks to the rise of tin exports, 
matching the growth and levels of Brazil but just getting above 3 pounds sterling per capita 
by 1912. Mexico, one of the larger exporters over all, turns out as a small exporter in per 
capita terms, 2 pounds by 1912. But in exchange, it is the only country in which exports per 
capita grew from the beginning of the period.  
Central America concentrates few of the most diverse histories. Ranging between 1 and 2 
pounds per capita of exports all through, the countries that started from the lower levels of 
the sub-region, Ecuador and El Salvador, steadily grew. In the mean time, the initially larger 
                                                 
13 The absence of Cuba in the data set for the 1890s may question this statement. Yet on the view of the trends 
presented here it is difficult to envision Cuba having greater exports per capita than Uruguay by 1890.                                                                                                            Protectionist but globalised? 
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exporters per capita of Central America, Guatemala and Nicaragua remained pretty flat, 
while Honduras levels kept falling.  
Finally, the Colombian case is highly interesting as it reflects the loss of its wealthiest 
province –Panama, independent from 1903. While the former province’s exports per capita 
spurred upwards, Colombia was left with the lowest level of exports per capita of the region. 
Thus Colombians were the Latin American citizens obtaining the less absolute profit from 
participating in the international markets. 
 
[TABLE 1: LATIN AMERICAN EXPORT CONCENTRATION CIRCA 1913] 
 
It stands clear from this description that the national experiences of exports varied 
considerably from fast growth (Puerto Rico, Bolivia), to steady growth (Argentina, Chile, 
Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru), passing by stagnation (Uruguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua) 
and pure decline (Honduras). The different resource endowments may have played a role on 
the evolution of exports as it may have done the choice of trade partners, but it does not seem 
to have a clear connection with independent behaviours. As shown in Table 1, most of Latin 
America had counted eggs in very few baskets. Whether the specialisation was on packed 
meat or silver, bananas or nitrate, the fact is that only one, at most two commodities made 
most of the exports of each country, and these were generally destined to one or two markets 
at most. Bértola and Williamson accrued the differences on the levels of exports per capita to 
the specialisation of the countries.
14 Settler economies, they say, doubled exports per capita 
of tropical economies. Yet taken one by one, the position of Cuba (a tropical country in their 
account), Chile (classified as highland country), the challenge of Puerto Rico (another 
tropical) and the permanence of Costa Rica (yet another one) question their explanation. 
Either the trade partners seem to explain neither levels nor trends pre-1914; the larger 
exporters per capita had each different main partner at the end of the period: Uruguay-
France, Argentina-United Kingdom, Cuba-United States. As pointed by Salvucci the agenda 
                                                 
14 Bértola, L. and J.G. WILLIAMSON. 2006. "Globalization in Latin America Before 1940," in The Cambrigde 
Economic History of Latin America. V Bulmer-Thomas, J. H. Coatsworth and Roberto Cortés Conde eds. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.29                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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is open for new questions and novel explanations, shifting the research agenda to the 
configuration of domestic policies, politics and institutions.
15 
A far more interesting question than the intra-regional evolution of exports is whether Latin 
American citizens grasped more, less or equal benefits per capita from exports than other 
regions of the world at this time of globalization. The United Kingdom Statistical Abstract 
for the Principal and Other Foreign Countries allows investigating this matter in detail from 
1890 to 1912. The full set of data includes total value of imports and exports of merchandise 
into and from over 80 countries and colonies, excluding British colonies and dominions. 
Unfortunately the lack of population data for the French and German colonies erases all of 
Africa and most of Asia from the per capita comparisons.
16 Nevertheless, since the Latin 
American republics made for a large share of the independent countries of the world in the 
pre-1914 years, it is particularly relevant to compare their level of exports per capita with that 
of other independent countries rather than colonies or dominions which exports levels may 
have been linked to their metropolis.
17   
 
[FIGURE 3: EXPORT PER CAPITA COMPARISON, WORLD REGIONS, 1890-1912] 
 
In Figure 3, Latin American countries are split in three groups according to their levels of 
exports per capita by 1912, and placed side by side with the exports per capita of over 25 
countries grouped in six regions of the world: Western Europe (Belgium, France, the German 
Empire, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom); Southern Europe (Greece, 
                                                 
15 Salvucci, R. 2006. "Export-led Industrialisation," in The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America. V 
Bulmer-Thomas, J. H. Coatsworth and Roberto Cortés Conde eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
249-92. 
16 As mentioned earlier Latin American populations were borrowed from the database behind. Yañez, C., 
M.d.M. Rubio, and A. Carreras. 2006. "Economic modernisation in Latin America and the Caribbean between 
1890 and 1925: A view from the energy consumption," in 2006 Cliometrics Conference. Binghamton, NY. The 
populations of Russian Empire, German Empire, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Servia, Rumania and Egypt are the 
ones of the. UNITED KINGDOM: HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. (various years). Statistical 
Abstract for the Principal and Other Foreign Countries. London. The rest of countries’ population data are 
from Maddison, A. 2003. "The World Economy: Historical Statistics.". OECD Development Centre: Paris..  
17  Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 2003. The Economic History of Latin America since Independence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press., Table 3.5, compares Latin American exports per head circa 1850, 1870, 1890 and 
1912 with those of New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the USA. The first three all belonging to the British 
Empire and their trade listed on the Statistical Abstract for the several Colonial and Other Possessions of the 
United Kingdom for a reason; The last one betting on its own internal market. They do not make a fair group for 
comparison with Latin American republics.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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Italy, Portugal and Spain); Eastern Europe (Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Servia); 
Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden); Middle and Far East (China, Japan, 
Netherlands West Indies, the Philippines, Egypt and Persia); and a special group for the 
Russian Empire and the United states called ‘Big Shots’. The data for individual countries 
are shown rather than using averages (whether weighted or un-weighted), given the spread in 
levels and the divergence in trends observed above. 
Figure 3 reveals that in fact only the most commercial countries of Western Europe exported 
more per capita than the leading exporting nations of Latin America. In a world where the 
upper end of exports per capita was led by the Netherlands alone, doubling the levels of the 
second and third ones, Belgium and Switzerland, this should come as not surprise. Surprising 
is that the champion of free trade, the United Kingdom, exported per capita in levels 
equivalents to those of Uruguay, Argentina  and Cuba. And equally interesting is that the 
small open economies of Scandinavia exported per capita slightly less than the leading Latin 
American exporters, including Chile, Costa Rica and Puerto Rico. 
The levels of exports per capita of the second Latin American group, all the way from Brazil 
to El Salvador, were slightly superior to most countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. 
Even Latin American citizens obtaining the less profit from participating in the international 
markets, the Colombians, were getting more than the Asian citizens, by far the less exposed 
to global markets.  
In general, Figure 3 supports the view that the average Latin American citizen was getting 
more out of the international markets than the inhabitants of any other region, outside 
Western Europe, before 1914. Furthermore, if we are to believe Maddison’s data on income 
per capita for the few Latin American countries that it exists in this period, the linkage to 
world markets became even stronger.
18 Latin American countries, at equivalent incomes per 
capita, systematically had larger exports per capita than other countries. Thus it follows that 
the importance of exports relative to income must have been far more important for Latin 
American countries than for any other region of the world, except possibly the Low 
Countries. See Figure 4. 
 
                                                 
18 Maddison, A. 2003. "The World Economy: Historical Statistics.". OECD Development Centre: Paris.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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[FIGURE 4: EXPORTS vs. INCOME PER CAPITA, WORLD REGIONS 1890-1912] 
 
This first insight only tells us that Latin Americans were able to sell in the world markets at 
least as much as everyone else, and in some cases much more, relative to their population 
sizes and incomes. It does not tell us whether they were net winners in their relation with the 
international markets. Yet, trade balances also favoured Latin America through out this 
period regardless the amount of exports per capita as shown in Figure 5. In fact, except for 
Honduras and Paraguay, Latin American countries all had systematic positive trade balances 
for the two decades before World War I. This may help to explain why it was during this 
period that most Latin American countries got on or returned to the gold standard, but 
Paraguay remained on inconvertible paper regime.
19 None of the other regions of the sample 
managed systematic positive trade balances, except for the United States and the Russian 
Empire. 
 
[FIGURE 5: TRADE BALANCES COMPARISON, WORLD REGIONS, 1890-1912] 
 
From this  look at the export side of Latin American trade over the last two decades of the 
first era of globalization tells us that Latin Americans were able to sell in the world markets 
at least as much as everyone else, and in some cases much more, relative to their population 
sizes and incomes. From the results of this section it derives that Latin American citizens 
were much more linked through their exports to international trade than citizens of Southern 
and Eastern Europe, Asia, the Russian Empire or the United States. And furthermore, Latin 
Americans were net winners in the exchange with world markets, selling to the world 
markets in excess of what they imported, for the twenty years before 1914. Yet, if Latin 
America, the United States and the Russian Empire had no rival exhibiting trade surpluses 
the question is whether this was the result of effective protection on the import side. This is 
                                                 
19 Salvucci, R. 2006. "Export-led Industrialisation," in The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America. V 
Bulmer-Thomas, J. H. Coatsworth and Roberto Cortés Conde eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
249-92., Table 7.3 offers the institutional arrangements and monetary regimes under which Latin America 
operated between 1870 and 1930.                                                                                                            Protectionist but globalised? 
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explored in the issuing sections. After exploring the custom collection, the levels of imports 
will be analysed. 
 
2. Latin American custom duties during the pre-1914 ‘belle époque’ 
Data on total custom duties collected is much more scant in the Abstract than data in total 
trade.
20 Data on custom collection for 1890 is provided for 30 countries expanding the list up 
to 43 by 1912.  Of those, 8 are Latin American at the earliest date (Argentine, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) becoming 10 by 1912 (adding Colombia, 
Cuba and Peru, but losing Paraguayan data). But before looking into the levels, lets make 
clear the crucial role played by custom revenues for Latin American governments. 
 
[TABLE 2: CUSTOM REVENUE OVER CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES, LatAm] 
 
One should remind  that in ‘countries with little experience with tax collection, few 
bureaucratic resources to implement it efficiently, and limited access to foreign capital 
markets, customs revenues are an easy-to-collect source of fiscal income essential to support 
central government expenditures on defense and civil administration’.
21 That was certainly 
the case of Latin America. Table 2 shows the crucial importance that custom revenues had as 
fiscal source of income. For the six Latin American countries which data are available 
custom duties represented between half and three quarters of total government revenues, 
reaching almost 90 percent in the case of Chile by 1910.
22 It is expected that other countries 
in the region would have levels of reliance on custom duties of no less than 50 per cent on 
average. 
The relevance of custom revenues for Latin American governments shall serve as 
background for the analysis of the levels of average tariff rate -custom revenues as a share of 
total import values- as well as duty collection per capita in Latin America. 
                                                 
20 While according to the Abstract all efforts were made in order to assure the custom collection reflected those 
duties imposed on imports only, it also recognised that it was not always possible to distinguish from other 
custom collection (namely exports). Thus for now, we will refer to the figures as ‘custom collection’ assuming 
for the most part refer to those levied on imports, but no giving it for granted. 
21 Coatsworth, J. H. and J.G. Williamson. 2004. "Always Protectionist? Latin American Tariffs from 
Independence to Great Depression." Journal of Latin American Studies, 36, pp. 205-32.: p.216 
22 Mitchell, B.R. . 2003. International Historical Statistics - The Americas, 1750-2000. Basingstoke: McMillan.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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[FIG 6: CUSTOM COLLECTION (% OVER IMPORTS), LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 1890-1912] 
 
Figure 6 shows the custom collection in as percentage over imports for the 10 Latin 
American countries which data are available in the Abstract. The spread is wide. While Chile 
started and ended the period below 20 per cent, Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Cuba basically 
remained in levels between 20 and 30 percent but few others such as Brazil, Colombia or 
Venezuela reached levels above 50 per cent. At the same time, Costa Rica wandered up and 
down more ostensibly than any other country in the region. By contrast, Uruguay remained 
within the boundaries of the 30 to 40 per cent levels fairly stable.  
So, clearly, if we were to take the average tariff rate as indicator of protectionism, it could be 
safely said that Chile was the less protectionist country of Latin America by the eve of World 
War I –despite its reliance on custom duties for government income-, while Colombia was 
the most protectionist. It is also worth mentioning here that the time trend observed of the 
average tariff rate in Latin America comes out slightly declining as we approach the end of 
the first globalisation era.
23  
 
[FIG. 7: CUSTOM COLLECTION PER CAPITA, LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1890-1912] 
 
The degree of success of the Latin American governments capturing revenues from 
international trade is better reflected in the amount of custom duties collected relative to their 
population size –for it reflected the potential tax base, while the expenditure would also 
relate to the population to be served. Remember that high tariffs do not guarantee large 
custom collections, either absolute or in per capita terms. Here no other government seized 
more per capita from taxing international trade than the Uruguayan one. Over two pounds 
sterling per capita collected from custom duties for the entire period. The Argentine and 
Cuba achieved similar levels towards at the eve of World War I, but a much lower average 
                                                 
23 Coatsworth, J. H. and J.G. Williamson. 2002. "The roots of Latin American Protectionism: Looking before 
the Great Depression." NBER Working Papers, 8999. p.32 insist that ‘tariffs rates in Latin America were even 
on the rise in the decades before 1914’, for a period extending from 1870. Also: Coatsworth, J. H. and J.G. 
Williamson. 2004. "Always Protectionist? Latin American Tariffs from Independence to Great Depression." 
Journal of Latin American Studies, 36, pp. 205-32., p.5 assert that ‘the rise in Latin America’s tariffs from the 
1860s to the turn of the century was much steeper than was true of Europe’.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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tariff rate as seen above. Despite the wide differences in their average tariff rate, Costa Rica, 
Chile and Brazil managed within half and one pound per habitant collected at customs. 
Finally Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Mexico all obtained less than half a pound per capita 
from taxing international trade. Observe that the Colombian government obtained relatively 
little per capita from custom collection despite having the highest average tariff of the region. 
Something very similar can b said of Brazil. As mentioned above, no necessarily the highest 
average tariff rate implied the largest collection per capita. In truth some of the highest 
collectors in per capita terms had not very high average tariff rates, say Cuba, Argentine, 
Costa Rica and Chile. This would indicate that optimal tariffs (that which maximise income 
for the collector) were not in place in some countries such as Brazil of Colombia, but might 
had been close to achievement in other parts of Latin America. The fit of the time trend 
reflects a certain tendency towards increasing duty collection per capita by the first decade of 
the 20
th century, or at most a flat trend, the opposite trend to the declining trend observed in 
the average tariff rate.  
Thus here as with exports, Colombia was getting less than any other Latin American country 
from its relations with the world markets. It had the lower exports per capita of the region 
and its government obtained less per capita than any other in the region from custom 
collection. At the other end, the countries whose citizens were already well linked to world 
markets through exports – Uruguay, Argentine and Cuba- were also the ones whose 
governments were capturing more revenues from international trade measured per habitant. 
 
[FIG.8: COLLECTION (% OVER IMPORTS), WORLD REGIONS, 1890-1912] 
 
How do Latin American custom collections contrast with the rest of the world? The answer is 
plotted in Figures 8 and 9. In Figure 8 it is easy to check that no other group of countries 
match the high average tariff rates of Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. Nevertheless, 
individual countries may have punctual levels close to these countries. For instance by the 
change of the century the levels of the Russian Empire were close to the 40 per cent levels, 
but never above. Even the Latin American countries with the lower average tariff rates come 
up as highly ‘protectionist’ in contrast with Asia, Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and overall                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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Western Europe. Yet, the latter two groups had the lower average tariff rates of the whole 
world.  
After all, Latin America diversity forces us to look more closely at the country level. High 
average tariff rates are of course found in the United Status, but also in Portugal, Greece, the 
Phillipines and the Russian Empire. These match, and in occasions surpass, the levels of 
Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Cuba. Thus Latin American countries are not that alone in the 
business of high ‘protection’. 
 
 [FIG. 9: COLLECTION PER CAPITA, WORLD REGIONS, 1890-1912] 
 
Figure 9 corroborates the fact that the Latin American republics had no rival capturing 
revenues from custom collection. No region achieved the collection of duties per capita of 
Uruguay, Argentina, Cuba or Costa Rica. In no other region was the foreign trade fiscalised 
over 1 pound sterling per capita, with the only exception of Norway towards the end of the 
period. Even the governments collecting less per capita in Latin America, still were able to 
grasp more from duties than most regions in the world. There are several reflections to this 
effect. First, when interacting with the world economy, Latin American citizens contributed 
to their government income more than any other citizens in the world. Second, Latin 
American governments were champions obtaining custom duties relative to their population 
size. Finally, Latin American nations depended on the fiscal revenues generated by 
international trade as no other independent government of the time.    
 
 
3. But they buy (despite duties!): Latin America imports over the ‘belle époque’  
 
Could this bulky custom collection be the explanation behind the export surpluses observed 
in the previous section? The cross-country comparisons shown in Figure 10 do not give a 
conclusive answer. Countries with lower average tariffs rates concentrate most of the trade 
deficits (Western Europe, Scandinavia and parts of Asia and the Middle East), while 
countries with higher average tariff rates tended to be the ones with the most favourable trade                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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balances, but not always. Latin America, The United States, the Russian Empire and part of 
Southern Europe had, as we have seen, average tariffs rates above 20 per cent. The first three 
all exhibited clear trade surpluses but no the Southern European nations. This could be taken 
as an indication that high tariffs must have had a powerful protective effect in Latin America, 
the United States and the Russian Empire. Such explanation would actually require these 
countries to have smaller levels of imports per capita in contrast with nations with lower 
tariffs.  
 
[FIG.10: TRADE BALANCE vs AVERAGE TARIFF RATE, 1890-1912] 
 
Lets have a look at the imports per capita of the 19 Latin American republics for which data 
are available in the Abstract. These are shown in Figure 11. Despite the relatively bulky 
custom the faced, Latin American citizens imported in increasing amounts, at least very 
clearly so from 1900. Here more clearly than before, the regional divide appears neatly. The 
larger importers of the region in per capita terms were the usual suspects: Cuba, Argentine, 
Uruguay, Chile, Puerto Rico and Costa Rica. They all imported, by the end of the period 
between 5 and 10 pounds per capita. After a gap of over two pounds per capita, the second 
group of importers was led by Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and towards the end of the period 
Mexico and Peru. Central American countries had an interesting behaviour with Nicaragua, 
Ecuador and Guatemala being at the top of this second group of importers by 1900 but 
loosing positions towards the end of the period. There were also countries importing very 
little per capita relative to the large and medium importers of the region. El Salvador, 
Honduras, Venezuela and over all Colombia imported in relatively small amounts (less than a 
tenth of the larger importers). At this stage, the position of Colombia is not a surprise any 
longer. For every one of the indicators Colombians come out as the Latin American citizens 
less linked to the world economy, and at the same time were the ones facing the highest 
average tariff rates. Yet, even the small and highly ‘protected’ increased their imports per 
capita in the run up to World War I. 
 
[FIG.11: IMPORTS PER CAPITA IN LATIN AMERICA OVER THE ‘BELLE ÈPOQUE’]                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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Not only did the Latin American republics import in increasing amounts, they also imported 
in similar, at time larger, amounts than other parts of the world in per capita terms. Figure 12 
contrast the Latin American imports per capita with those of other independent countries of 
the time. The Latin American countries are grouped according to their import levels in large, 
medium and small importers. Latin America’s top importers in per capita terms were 
importing in amounts similar to those of the Scandinavian countries –always thought of as 
open economies-. In fact, only the most commercial nations of Western Europe –the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Demark- imported more per 
capita than Cuba, Uruguay or Argentina.  
 
[FIGURE 12: IMPORTS PER CAPITA COMPARISON, WORLD REGIONS, 1890-1912] 
 
If we look at the medium size importers, they imported at levels equivalent to those of 
Southern and Eastern Europe. Even the small importers among the Latin American nations, 
including Colombia, imported more than the Russian Empire (who were indeed applying 
high average tariff rates too) and the Asian nations of the sample. Observe that Latin 
American countries were in general importing more per capita than nations with much lower 
average tariff rates, but also imported more than nations with equally high average tariff rates 
such as the Russian Empire, Portugal, the Philippines or Greece. Given this evidence, it is not 
possible to say that Latin America was de-linked from the international economy, despite the 
high custom collection. Latin American citizens were buying from the world markets in 
reasonably large amounts. 
 
[TABLE 3: EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND CUSTOM COLLECTIONS PER CAPITA, 
WORLD COMPARISON AT THREE DATES 1890, 1901, 1910] 
  
A closer look at the figures can be obtained from Table 3 for years 1890, 1901 and 1910. 
Ranked according to their imports per capita in those years, it is clear that Uruguay, the 
Argentine and Cuba were top world importers right behind the most open economies of the 
time, despite facing average tariff rates ten times higher than the European countries                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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immediately above and below their levels. Table 3 also insists in the wide differences across 
Latin America, which in terms of per capita imports, were at least as wide as the observed 
among the European of the core and the periphery, and possibly wider. It is true, however 
that if we draw a line at the level of the US imports per capita, knowing that they were a 
closed economy, then a large number of Latin American countries will appear as closed 
economies given their low level of imports per capita. Yet the income per capita of the US 
was the highest of the world at this time, thus the comparison of import per capita  without 
looking at income levels is futile. Income per capita is plotted against import per capita in 
Figure 13. 
 
[FIGURE 13: IMPORTS VS INCOME PER CAPITA, WORLD REGIONS, 1890-1912] 
 
Relative to their income, Latin Americans were still importing in large amounts. Take for 
instance Brazil, a medium importer per capita within Latin America. Relative to its income 
per capita, Brazil was importing per capita much more than countries having equivalent 
income. Or in other words, Brazil imports per capita were at the level of countries that had a 
much higher income per capita. Thus relative to its income the Brazilian were spending more 
in the international markets than many other nations. The same can be said, of the other Latin 
American nations for which income data are available: they imported at the levels 
appropriate for the income levels they had, and some times imported above the expected 
level. If high tariffs had a powerful protective effect one should observe lower imports per 
capita not only relative to other countries, but also relative to the income level of the 
countries. This is no much evidence of reduced imports in Latin America in either case. For 
some reason, despite the high custom collection Latin American countries continue to import. 
 
[FIGURE 14: AVERAGE TARIFF RATE vs IMPORTS PER CAPITA, LATAM. 1890-1912] 
[FIGURE 15: DUTIES PER CAPITA vs IMPORTS PER CAPITA, LATAM. 1890-1912] 
 
The fact that high average tariff rates and high custom collections were compatible with high 
imports per capita in Latin America over the ‘belle époque’ is evident from Figures 14 and                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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15. The former plots average tariff rates versus imports per capita, the later custom duties 
collection per capita versus imports per capita again. In Latin America high average tariff 
rates come hand in hand with high imports per capita, while in Western Europe high average 
tariff rates produce lower import per capita. At the same time the same or larger imports per 
capita are compatible with much higher custom duties collection per capita in Latin America, 
but not elsewhere. Custom tariffs do not appear to have a protective effect in Latin America.  
This paradox calls for further investigation, possibly beyond the scope of this one paper. 
Nevertheless some tentative explanations can be outlined for these results to hold: the 
possibility of a differential price-elasticity of demand for imports in Latin America, the 
inadequacy of using average tariff rates as indicator of protection and finally the possible 
problems associated with the data reported as customs collections. 
First, price-elasticity of demand determines how protective a tariff actually is. If the demand 
for imports is very elastic, thus it reacts quickly and in large amounts to a change in prices, a 
small increase in the tariff would reduce the amounts imported meaningfully. On the 
contrary, if the products imported were relatively price-inelastic, thus people continue to 
demand them regardless of a price increase then, an increase in the import tariff will not 
reduce imports. Therefore, the proportion of low elasticity of demand products –and the 
intensity of such inelasticity- in the imports basket of any given country will be crucial for 
the determining the impact of the import tariff . Therefore, one could very well face the 
paradox presented above assuming that the Latin American imports were more price-inelastic 
than the demand for imports in other countries so that Latin American citizens continued to 
import much needed or wanted goods despite the high tariffs.
24 If so was the case, then 
average import tariff cannot be considered protective for inelasticity works both ways. As 
much as the quantity imported did not diminish at higher prices (due to tariffs), smaller tariffs 
would not produce higher demand for these goods. Furthermore, the changing nature of the 
import basket across time and countries will result in very different impacts of tariffs on the 
amounts imported across time and place. Evidence regarding price elasticity of the demand 
for imports in Latin America is lacking and research on this area should quickly be up in the 
agenda of economic historians.   
                                                 
24 Income distribution may also play an important role in this regard given that the income elasticity of the 
demand for imports will determine the type of products to be imported.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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Even if one could question the differential price-inelasticity of Latin American imports, the 
average tariff rate has itself been questioned as a good measure of protection. From the 
average tariff rate one can not say whether what is being taxed are luxurious goods paying 
incredibly high amounts to enter the country, while most things enter paying relatively little 
or non duty or whether a uniform tariff is applied throughout to all imports. These two tariff 
rules would have very different impact on the actual imports but may turn out to show very 
similar average tariff rates depending of the amounts imported, the size of the tax, and the 
price elasticity of the products imported. Thus the pledge for separate cross country 
industrial, primary and fiscal product tariff average made by some scholars within the 
European context would also be advisable before further assessment of the Latin American 
tariff.
25 
Last but not least, the possible problems associated with the data reported as customs 
collections must also be considered. From a European perspective custom collection is 
directly identified to duties levied on imports. Elsewhere in the world such assumption is no 
so clear. Even when the heading of the corresponding table in the Abstract   says ‘Total 
Amount of import duties collected in each of the respective countries’ the footnotes to the 
earlier years explain that it was not always possible to distinguish import from other custom 
collection (namely exports). Thus far in the paper we have always referred to the figures as 
‘custom collection’ assuming for the most part refer to those levied on imports, but it cannot 
be given for granted. Several hints indicate that one should be cautious before the possibility 
that custom duties in Latin America included not only import but also export duties charged 
on minerals and cash-crops exported.  For instance, given that custom collection was so 
crucial for Latin American countries, taxing exports was the obvious second best to taxing 
exports. They indeed taxed exports by 1929 Chilean custom duties were half imports half 
export duties according to Bulmer-Thomas data.  Section one above explains that moderate 
export taxes were among the policies implemented among the Latin American countries. It 
also reports that Latin American nations commanded many commodity markets, and thus 
could well be rolling on to the world markets the price increases due to export taxes. The 
continuous revision of the data by correlative Abstracts and the notes to the figures provided 
                                                 
25 Tena, A. 2001. "Measuring Protection over time. Revenue and Protective Tariffs in 19th Century Commercial 
Policy History." Working Paper 01-65 Economic History and Institutions Series. Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid.                                                                                                           Protectionist but globalised? 
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also hint at the common the inclusion of export duties along with import duties. Even if 
export duties were not included for all countries in Latin America (and elsewhere outside 
Europe) and even when their importance may be small (2 to 10 per cent of all custom 
collected), it would suffice to drop the average tariff rates to more standard levels.  
Conclusion 
Whatever the explanation for the paradox might turn out to be, this paper comes to show that 
there is no contradiction between the high custom collection by the Latin American republics 
and their high level of interaction with the global economy in the pre-1914 belle époque. The 
links to the world economy were strong through their exports and significantly through a 
large level of imports per capita, although large country differences can be observed when 
descending from the regional to the national level. Tariffs did not have the assumed powerful 
protective effect in the pre-1913 period in Latin America. The explanation of why this was 
the case should be the next step in the agenda, particularly since further insights about the 
relationship between globalization (or protectionism) and economic growth are at stake. The 
good reputation of protectionism in the pre-1913 era may be a fallacy if actually protection as 
such did not exist, but simply an excellent ability by governments to capture rents out of the 
interaction of their citizens with the world economy.  
What it is clear from the results of this paper is that Latin American citizens were much more 
linked to international trade than citizens of Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, the Russian 
Empire or the United States. In per capita terms, their relation to the world economy was 
tighter both via their imports and their exports, relative to their population size and their 
income. More crucially, Latin American governments depended on revenues generated by 
international trade as no other independent government of the time. Consequently, it comes 
as no surprise that when the international markets were shaken from 1914 onwards, no other 
citizens were more hurt than the Latin American ones. The belle époque remains as linked to 
the international markets for Latin America as ever. 
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Argentina maize 23% wheat 21% 43% UK 25% Germany 11% 36%
Bolivia Tin 72% silver 4% 77% UK 74% Germany 12% 87%
Brasil coffee 62% Rubber 16% 78% USA 36% Germany 14% 50%
Chile nitrates 71% copper 7% 78% USA 40% Germany 20% 60%
Colombia coffee 37% gold 20% 58% USA 45% UK 14% 58%
Costa Rica bananas 51% coffee 35% 86% USA 49% UK 42% 91%
Cuba sugar 72% tobacco 20% 92% USA 84% UK 8% 91%
Ecuador cacao 64% coffee 5% 70% France 35% USA 30% 65%
El Salvador coffee 80% precious mettals 16% 96% USA 30% Germany 23% 53%
Guatemala coffee 85% bananas 6% 91% Germany 53% USA 27% 80%
Honduras bananas 50% precious mettals 26% 76% USA 86% Germany 5% 91%
Mexico silver 30% copper 10% 41% USA 75% UK 15% 91%
Nicaragua coffee 65% precious mettals 14% 79% USA 35% Germany 25% 60%
Panamá bananas 65% coconuts 7% 72% USA 94% Germany 4% 98%
Paraguay yerba mate 32% tobacco 16% 48% Germany 22% 22%
Perú copper 22% sugar 15% 37% UK 33% USA 28% 62%
Puerto Rico sugar 47% coffee 19% 66% USA 86% Cuba 7% 93%
Uruguay wool 42% meat 24% 66% France 17% Germany 16% 33%
Venezuela coffee 52% cacao 21% 73% USA 32% France 29% 62%
Sources: Bulmer-Thomas(2003) for commodities; own elaboration from Abstract data for countries of destination
All data on countries of destination belong to 1912 except for Ecuador which correspond to 1910  
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Exports per capita comparison, world regions 1890-1912
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FIGURE 4 
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract. For population figures see text.  
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Trade Balances comparison, world regions 1890-1912
 
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract 
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Custom revenue over central government revenues
1895 1900 1910
Argentina 54% 48% 56%
Brazil na 54% 54%
Chile 74% 72% 89%
Mexico
Peru na 57% 46%
Uruguay 67% 49% 60%
Venezuela 75% na na
USA 47% 41% 48%
Sources: Michell, B.R.(2003)
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Note: Actual data plotted
Time trend shown with confidence interval shaded
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Custom collection in Latin America over the 'belle époque'
 
FIGURE 6 
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Note: Time trend shown (quadratic fit) with confidence interval shaded
(pounds esterling)
Custom collection per capita in Latin America over the 'belle époque'
 
FIGURE 7 
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract. For population figures see text.                                                                                                            Protectionist but globalised? 
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(as percentage over imports)
Custom duties collected, world regions 1890-1912
 
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract 
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Custom duties collected per capita
world regions, 1890-1912
  Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract. For population figures see text.  
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Custom collection over imports (%)
Graphs by region
Trade Balance vs average tariff rate, 1890-1912
 
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract 
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year
Note: Time trend shown (quadratic fit) with confidence interval shaded
Imports per capita in Latin America over the 'belle époque'
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract. For population figures see text.  
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Imports per capita comparison, world regions 1890-1912
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract 































Netherlands NET 19,88 23,74 0,10 0% Netherlands NET 27,61 32,39 0,16 0% Netherlands NET 36,88 45,50 0,19 0%
Switzerland SWI 9,82 13,59 0,42 3% Switzerland SWI 10,33 13,39 0,55 4% Belgium BEL 18,18 22,75 0,36 2%
United Kingdom UK 7,03 11,22 0,54 5% Belgium BEL 10,75 13,06 0,30 2% Switzerland SWI 13,11 19,15 0,85 4%
Belgium BEL 9,43 10,97 0,21 2% United Kingdom UK 6,74 10,93 0,73 7% United Kingdom UK 9,58 12,79 0,76 6%
Uruguay UR 8,67 9,65 2,89 30% Denmark DEN 6,22 8,50 0,65 8% Denmark DEN 9,36 11,13 0,61 6%
Argentine AR 6,07 8,56 1,13 13% Cuba CU 7,76 8,00 Argentine AR 11,27 10,64 2,30 22%
Denmark DEN 4,72 6,50 0,57 9% Norway NOR 3,81 6,82 0,86 13% Cuba CU 13,48 9,18 2,24 24%
Norway NOR 3,46 5,62 0,60 11% Uruguay UR 6,25 5,34 1,86 35% Norway NOR 6,24 9,03 1,11 12%
Costa Rica CR 4,87 4,87 1,46 30% Sweden SWE 3,81 4,95 0,53 11% Uruguay UR 7,30 7,27 2,43 33%
France FRE 3,75 4,44 0,36 8% Argentine AR 7,18 4,88 1,43 29% France FRE 6,05 6,96 0,56 8%
Sweden SWE 3,54 4,37 0,49 11% German Empire GER 3,83 4,69 0,45 10% Sweden SWE 6,04 6,82 0,62 9%
German Empire GER 3,44 4,30 0,39 9% France FRE 3,95 4,30 0,38 9% German Empire GER 5,66 6,77 0,54 8%
Chile CH 4,11 4,12 0,75 18% Chile CH 4,35 3,49 0,70 20% Chile CH 7,13 6,69 1,06 16%
Roumania ROU 2,13 2,81 0,17 6% Findland FIN 2,80 3,23 0,44 14% Panama PN 1,11 6,29
United States USA 2,78 2,56 0,75 29% Costa Rica CR 3,20 2,44 0,68 28% Puerto Rico PR 7,02 5,67
Findland FIN 1,56 2,38 0,34 14% Portugal POR 1,17 2,39 0,61 25% Findland FIN 3,96 5,25 0,65 12%
Portugal POR 0,96 1,98 0,66 33% United States USA 3,91 2,16 0,62 29% Costa Rica CR 4,73 4,46 1,31 29%
Spain SPA 1,96 1,92 0,22 11% Italy IT 1,62 2,03 0,29 14% Italy IT 2,27 3,55 0,35 10%
Paraguay PY 1,84 1,73 0,63 36% Spain SPA 1,62 1,95 0,30 16% United States USA 3,84 3,47 0,73 21%
Bulgaria BUL 1,42 1,68 0,16 10% Roumania ROU 2,31 1,91 0,15 8% Portugal POR 1,37 2,66 0,62 23%
Italy IT 1,13 1,67 0,30 18% Puerto Rico PR 1,85 1,91 Austro-Hungary A_H 2,04 2,41 0,18 8%
Venezuela VZ 2,06 1,39 0,58 42% Egypt EGP 1,60 1,51 0,24 16% Roumania ROU 3,54 2,35 0,30 13%
Austro-Hungary A_H 1,56 1,23 0,08 7% Austro-Hungary A_H 1,71 1,50 0,09 6% Brazil BZ 2,84 2,15 0,87 40%
Egypt EGP 1,79 1,22 0,18 15% Paraguay PY 1,01 1,20 Paraguay PY 1,59 2,07
Greece GRE 0,85 1,08 0,22 20% Brazil BZ 2,21 1,16 0,50 43% Egypt EGP 2,52 2,05 0,28 14%
Servia SER 0,98 0,82 0,05 6% Ecuador EC 1,24 1,15 Spain SPA 1,95 2,01 0,29 14%
Russian Empire RUS 0,64 0,38 0,12 32% Greece GRE 0,75 1,12 0,16 14% Bolivia BO 3,06 2,00
Japan and Formosa JAP 0,23 0,34 0,01 4% Nicaragua NI 1,60 1,06 Bulgaria BUL 1,19 1,64 0,24 15%
China CHI 0,06 0,09 0,004 5% Mexico MEX 1,10 0,95 0,19 21% Mexico MEX 1,75 1,31 0,31 24%
Brazil BZ 0,80 Guatemala GU 1,65 0,94 Peru PE 1,77 1,25 0,22 17%
Peru PE 0,39 Peru PE 1,39 0,89 0,24 27% Greece GRE 1,09 1,21 0,33 28%
Mexico MEX 0,53 0,22 Honduras HO 1,18 0,80 Guatemala GU 2,00 1,19
N 3 02 93 22 9 B o l i v i a B O 1 , 6 8 0 , 7 6 S e r v i a S E R 1 , 3 7 1 , 1 8 0 , 1 7 15%
Bulgaria BUL 0,87 0,74 0,11 15% Ecuador EC 1,97 1,16
Servia SER 1,04 0,69 0,06 9% Nicaragua NI 1,72 1,08
El Salvador SL 1,07 0,64 Japan and Formosa JAP 0,96 0,99 0,07 8%
Philipines PHI 0,49 0,64 0,17 27% Honduras HO 0,83 0,97
Japan and Formosa JAP 0,59 0,61 0,04 6% Venezuela VZ 1,33 0,87 0,34 38%
Russian Empire RUS 0,59 0,46 0,17 37% Philipines PHI 0,82 0,76 0,14 18%
Netherlands East IndieNEI 0,47 0,42 0,02 5% El Salvador SL 1,47 0,76
China CHI 0,06 0,10 0,003 3% Colombia CO 0,74 0,72 0,35 48%
N 41 41 32 32 Russian Empire RUS 0,93 0,70 0,20 29%
, Netherlands East IndiesNEI 0,78 0,56 0,03 5%
China CHI 0,12 0,15 0,00 3%
N 4 44 43 53 5
 
 
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract 
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Latin American countries Rest of the World
Imports vs income per capita, world regions 1890-1912
Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract. For population figures see text.  
GDP figures from Maddison (2002) 
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Sources: elaborated from data by the UK Statistical Abstract 
FIGURE 14  FIGURE 15 